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Abstract 
The BUAA-BWB remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) designed by our research team encountered an unexpected landing safety 
problem in flight tests. It has obviously affected further research project for blended-wing-body (BWB) aircraft configuration 
characteristics. Searching for a safety improvement is an urgent requirement in the development work of the RPV. In view of the 
vehicle characteristics, a new systemic method called system-theoretic process analysis (STPA) has been tentatively applied to 
the hazardous factor analysis of the RPV flight test. An uncontrolled system behavior “path sagging phenomenon” is identified 
by implementing a three degrees of freedom simulation based on wind tunnel test data and establishing landing safety system 
dynamics archetype. To obtain higher safety design effectiveness and considering safety design precedence, a longitudinal 
“belly-flap” control surface is innovatively introduced and designed to eliminate hazards in landing. Finally, flight tests show 
that the unsafe factor has been correctly identified and the landing safety has been efficiently improved. 
Keywords: BWB RPV landing safety; STPA; system dynamics; safety design precedence; sagging phenomenon; belly-flap 
1. Introduction1 
Subscale demonstration is an important research 
method for investigating the new conceptual aircraft 
configuration design characteristics. As in 2010, a 2.5 
m wing span technology demonstrator called DEMON 
was flown by Cranfield University to perform its new 
FLAVIR Integrated Program [1]. 
Blended-wing-body (BWB) is a new aircraft con-
figuration without conventional fuselage and tails [2]. 
Its high lift-to-drag ratio combined with foreseeable 
aircraft-engine integration benefits in term of noise, 
operation cost and structural weight promises a bright 
future for new generation civil aircraft [3-4]. As in 2007, 
a 6 m wing span subscale vehicle called X-48B low- 
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speed vehicle (LSV) was put into flight test by NASA 
Dryden Flight Research Center to investigate low 
speed characteristics of full-scale BWB aircraft [5].  
2. Safety Problem of BUAA-BWB RPV 
2.1. Problem in flight test 
In our research, a flight experimental vehicle called 
BUAA-BWB remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) was de-
veloped to investigate and demonstrate low-speed 
aerodynamic and fight dynamic features of BWB. 
Scaled-down from the 250-passenger BWB [6], it is a 
1.6 m wing span vehicle with natural static stability in 
all the longitudinal, lateral and directional axes, with 
longitudinally a 15% static stability margin. It contains 
four elevons located on the trailing edge of outer wing 
and one main elevator on center body tail, driven by 
remote control device. The mounted thrust is produced 
by an advanced ducted fan suit engine which produces 
2.2 kg thrust by electric supply of 6 series 4 000 mAh 
Li-ion load cells. The engine is installed on rear end of Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
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center body and the maximum thrust- to-weight ratio of 
the whole vehicle reaches 0.7. The sketch is shown in 
Fig. 1, and the basic parameters are shown in Table 1 
(in which xcg is the gravity center, and xac is the mean 
aerodynamic center of the RPV). According to the de-
sign objectives, the vehicle possesses five aircraft- 
level functions, as shown in Fig. 2. 
 
Fig. 1  Sketch of BUAA-BWB RPV. 
Table 1  Basic parameters of BUAA-BWB RPV 
Parameter Value 
Weight of RPV/kg 3.10 
Maximum trust/kg 2.20 
Wing area/m2 0.6 
Aspect ratio of wing 4.57 
Wing span, mean aerodynamic chord/m 1.6, 0.57 
xcg, xac /m 0.50, 0.59 
Ix, Iy, Iz /(kg·m2) 0.23, 0.39, 0.40 
 
The vehicle performed its maiden flight at the end of 
2010. Designed and manufactured via a systemic 
“process control” procedure, the maiden flight showed 
that it was away from manufacturing and maintenance 
flaws which could reduce system safety. However, an 
unexpected behavior appeared in the flight test, raising 
concerns about the safety problem in the new BWB 
configuration. 
 
Fig. 2  Function tree of BUAA-BWB RPV. 
As shown in Fig. 3, in the landing process the vehi-
cle encountered an impact, rebounded from the runway  
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Fig. 3  RPV landing continuous photos. 
and rolled to the left side until scratching the wing. Be-
cause of the importance of safe landing to new configura-
tion vehicle, this phenomenon is treated as an accident. 
Identification of critical factors and proposing im-
provement measures can be based upon an RPV system 
hazard analysis.  
2.2. STPA-based system hazard analysis 
The BUAA-BWB RPV is naturally static in all the 
three-axis natural static stabilities, and the control 
commands are directly connected to control surfaces 
through remote control device. When a pilot controls 
vehicle, the information received from flight process 
refers to some sensed flight parameters, such as flight 
path angle, pitch angle and ground speed, taking land-
ing phase as example. In the previous accident, from 
post-flight review and pilot feedback, there was no 
flight control command implementation incorrectness, 
i.e no failures of system components, and the air-
craft/system-level function behavior was continuous, 
i.e. no dysfunctions of systems.  
From the viewpoint of system theories, the kernel 
takes systems as an integrated whole [7]. Recently, a 
new hazard analysis approach based on “social-tech- 
nical system” has been put forward by Leveson [8], in 
which the system safety is put in the directional posi-
tion of the system development, and the safety has 
guidance property in system design to maintain de-
manded safety. Leveson named it system-theoretic 
process analysis (STPA). Leveson believed that safety 
is not only passive development and operation result, 
but also positive guidance and necessary property to 
avoid risks that may induce accidents. Cause of acci-
dent is not a series of events, but results of inappropri-
ate or inadequate identification or control of “safety- 
related constraints” on system development process 
link, component of object system and behavior of or-
ganizations or individuals. In STPA, the hazardous 
factors that cause accidents may be design errors, hu-
man decision-making errors, social and organizational 
contributions, so that they are encompassed in an entire 
accident process, while traditional hazard analysis 
techniques are often inadequate and very limited in 
handling these potential ones [9]. 
According to STPA, an RPV flight test process is 
abstracted into a “controlled RPV flight process”, com-
bined with the “pilot” and “RPV systems”, to expose 
the whole possible causal factors that may lead to un-
safe situations. The STPA-based hazard analysis 
framework, as shown in Fig. 4, helps to build a process 
control loop applied to BUAA-BWB RPV for further 
hazard analysis. The unsafe flight situation causing un-
expected hazards to vehicle even the whole test project 
may occur when lacking enforcement of safety con-
straints, such as unexpected flight process feedback to 
pilot and control action from pilot containing risks which 
lead vehicle out of constraints. As mentioned, the process 
loops between RPV systems and pilot were certain to be 
under the desired constraints. The accident may attribute 
to the unexpected and uncontrolled characteristics of 
RPV system. The potential safety related factors that 
evolved to hazards might exist in loop links or process 
components, as indicated by dashed frame in Fig. 4.  
To ascertain how the “controlled RPV flight proc-
ess” could operate and to represent the way in which 
unsafe situations would occur as shown in Fig. 3, landing 
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simulation is a helpful quantitative analysis approach. As 
an improvement to STPA in this paper, the simulation 
provides important numerical data for identifying bind 
spots of critical RPV system safety constraints and is the 
basis of vehicle safety improvement measures. 
 
Fig. 4  Flight test process control loop of the RPV. 
3. Analysis on Causes of Landing Safety Problem
 Based on 3-DOF Simulation 
3.1. Source data from wind tunnel tests 
Focusing on the pitch movement on longitudinal 
axis direction, all lateral effects of the vehicle are ne-
glected, and the CL, CD and Cm data for simulation are 
from wind tunnel tests, as in Fig. 5.  
 
Fig. 5  BUAA-BWB wind tunnel test scene. 
After correction on the wall effects and balance 
support disturbance for the wind tunnel data, aerody-
namic data can be expressed as follows. 
The lift coefficient is 
 e eL L LC C Cα δα δ= +  (1) 
where α  is the angle of attack, eδ  the deflection 
angle of the elevator (conducted by the combined de-
flection of main elevator and elevons), LC α  the lift- 
curve slope, and 
eLC δ  the derivative of LC  with 
respect to eδ . 
The drag coefficient is 
 e eD D DC C Cα δα δ= +  (2) 
where DC α  is drag-curve slope, and eDC δ  the de-
rivative of DC  with respect to eδ . 
The pitching moment coefficient is 
 
e *
e
2
m m m mq
cC C C C q
V
α δα δ= + +  (3) 
where mC α is the pitch moment-curve slope, emC δ  
the derivative of mC  with respect to eδ , q the pitch 
rate, mqC  the derivative of mC  with respect to q, V * 
the reference airspeed, and c  the mean aerodynamic 
chord of the RPV wing. 
The static data after correction are shown in Fig. 6. 
 
Fig. 6  Curves of CL, CD and Cm wind tunnel test data. 
3.2. 3-DOF simulation 
The forces and moment in wind axis can be written as 
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where T is the engine thrust, D and L present the drag 
and lift of the RPV respectively. 
The 3-DOF motion parameters can be solved by the 
following differential equations. 
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where m is the mass of the RPV, γ and θ are 
flight-path angle and pitch angle respectively. 
In the simulation, a “height capture and hold” con-
trol strategy is used to simulate actual flight control 
actions which cause the vehicle to obtain a desired 
height in landing. An example is shown in Figs. 7-8, in 
which a gliding down flight path of −4 m is com-
manded, with the simulated results as solid lines, also 
compared with conventional aircraft with negligible 
control lift and drag (represented by CLδe and CDδe), as 
shown by dashed lines. In Fig. 7, the small symbol 
of aircraft on the solid line shows the BUAA-BWB 
RPV pitch attitude over time. In Fig. 8, the angle of 
attack, elevator deflection, and flight path angle are 
shown. 
 
Fig. 7  Gliding down to 4 m below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 8  Angle of attack and other motion parameters in 
gliding down. 
In the gliding down process, a pushover control is 
used. However, the initial response is climbing, rather 
than descending; in the final stage to capture the de-
sired height, a pull-up control results in the path 
“plunging”. It needs to notice that in plunging, the ve-
hicle levels off quickly as shown in Fig. 7, which 
makes pilot with conventional aircraft control ex-
perience insensible to such abnormal path evolving 
and unable to prevent its occurring, as the “con-
trolled RPV flight process” block indicates in Fig. 4. 
It caused the occurrence of the accident in Fig. 3. 
This unexpected terminal path plunging is called 
“sagging” phenomenon. 
More information to explain the cause of “sagging” 
is shown by the lift coefficient evolving in the process 
in Fig. 9. The additional lift induced by elevator deflec-
tion can be noticed. Because of the non-negligible lift by 
elevators attached to the wing trailing edge, i.e. 
eL
C δ , the 
trimmed angle of attack in initial level flight is higher 
than conventional aircraft under the same trimmed flight 
conditions. At the moment pilot pushes the stick, a re-
versed rising of flight path exists, caused by downward 
elevator deflection. The pilot tends to further deflect the 
elevator downward, subconsciously to produce more 
negative pitch moment to decrease the angle of attack. 
When the vehicle approaches the desired height, the 
pilot pulls back the stick, and the vehicle attitude be-
gins to pull up, but the path goes down as the elevator 
lifts downward, i.e., the so-called “sagging” phe-
nomenon. In order to accumulate higher angle of at-
tack to overcome the path plugging, the pilot tends to 
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Fig. 9  Lift coefficient variation curve in gliding down. 
hold elevator more up-deflection than in conventional 
cases, in spite that is useless. The additional sinking 
rate may result in harmful landing impact. 
Because of the manufacturing materials, the opera-
tional weight of the vehicle mentioned above is 3.2 kg 
and its wing-load is also low. The path plunging does 
not cause catastrophic accident, but the unexpected 
flight phenomenon has revealed the need to modify the 
configuration characteristic. For full scale aircraft, the 
safety consequences would be more serious if the pre-
sent configuration keeps unchanged. 
3.3. System dynamics archetype of vehicle landing 
process 
To clearly and completely represent the negative ef-
fects in landing safety processing, a so-called “system 
dynamics” approach [10] is used to identify and explain 
the vehicle behavior, in which the “system dynamics 
archetype” is the framework for system dynamic 
complexity description and safety problem elimina-
tion. Although stemming from socio-economic sys-
tem, this approach can also be applied to technical 
systems, with its background of control theory [11]. 
The archetype can indicate the problems of vehicle 
flight dynamics which is counterintuitive and com-
plex, leading to prediction inability of aircraft de-
signer and pilot. Based on the former simulation re-
sults, the BUAA-BWB RPV landing safety archetype 
is proposed (see Fig. 10).  
Fig. 10  System dynamics archetype of the vehicle landing process. 
According to the system dynamics archetype in Fig. 
10, the lift variation loop (inner left) in which the lift 
caused by the elevator deflection induces a reversed 
climbing angle control paralleling with another loop 
(inner right), i.e., the normal longitudinal control loop, 
affected by angle of attack. In addition, the ground 
effects may enhance the lift and positive pitch moment 
when the vehicle flies near ground. In the landing 
process (see Fig. 3), the ground effects do no obvious 
help to relieve the sagging trend. 
4. Modified Design for BUAA-BWB RPV Safety 
4.1.  Safety design precedence 
Under the guidance of STPA in Section 2, the cause 
for the vehicle landing safety problem has attributed to 
the incompleteness of safety requirements. Leveson 
indicated in her research that “the incompleteness of 
software or system logic design can be considered a 
requirement or functional design problem” [9]. Thisidea 
has been applied to the safety situation discussed in 
this paper. The safety problem includes differ-
entlevels of hazard severity in terms of classification in 
SAE ARP 4754 [12-13], and the effectiveness of resolv-
ing measures comes from the safety design principle 
called “system safety design precedence” as follows. 
As presented in Fig. 11, the lower precedence safety 
design is to sustain (fail-safe) or minimize component 
failures (redundancy) to reduce predictable hazards 
which may induce damages or losses. At this stage, 
passive safety protection methods may be used, such as 
enhanced structural coefficient in mechanical design or 
redundancy in electrical design. Upon this, the en-
hanced landing gear and its attached vehicle body 
structure could be introduced to the vehicle safety de-
sign. In practice, these safety improvement methods 
work when other efforts bring few benefits or they are 
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under constraints of other requirements, e.g. to im-
prove safety of carrier-born aircraft landing gears. Ob-
viously, passive measures could also result in extra 
weight, complexity and maintaining cost of the system.
Fig.11  System safety design precedence applicable to the RPV. 
Above that, improving pilot’s skills and modifying 
control strategy may reduce risks more effectively. For 
BUAA-BWB RPV, “unexpected sagging” could be 
predicted and avoided by the pilot, but the “lead con-
trol” effectiveness heavily relies on the piloting quali-
ties. Therefore, the safety design in higher precedence, 
such as hazard elimination measures, is needed to in-
crease effectiveness and also to decrease operational 
and maintaining costs. 
4.2. Modification measures 
Based on the hazard analysis in Section 3, safety 
problem attached to the vehicle landing phase attrib-
utes not to “component failures”, but to “uncontrolled 
system behavior”. This result means the derivation of 
safety requirement and attached constraints. For 
BUAA-BWB RPV, the path sagging could not be ef-
fectively eliminated by other flight control strategies 
based on conventional single longitudinal control sur-
face. So, following the “basic system safety design 
precedence” in Fig. 11 to eliminate hazards by system 
design, “substitution control surfaces” to decrease ele-
vator deflection becomes a feasible approach.  
An additional aerodynamic control surface, the 
so-called “belly-flap”, has been used under the vehicle 
center-body and in the longitudinal position of gravity 
center [14]. The flap is with a porosity of 23%, has a 
span of 20% of the aircraft wing span, a height of 23% 
of the mean aerodynamic chord and a maximum de-
flection angle of 90°. The increase in lift promises to 
be up to 30%, and the increase in pitching up moment 
near ground promises up to 8%. Its installed appear-
ance on the RPV is shown in Fig. 12. 
 
Fig. 12  Belly-flap installed on the underside of BUA- 
ABWB RPV. 
The introduction of additional belly-flap might pro-
duce new hazards affecting vehicle flight safety, which 
results in a need to add a derived safety assessment test. 
In flight test, safety verification to simulate flap uncon-
trollable deflection in different flight heights has been 
added. The flap deflects downwards to 90° when the 
vehicle approaches under ground effect (see Fig. 13). 
 
Fig. 13  Belly-flap deflecting from 0° to 90°. 
4.3. Verification by flight test 
With the belly-flap, the BUAA-BWB RPV landed 
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smoothly without any above-mentioned sagging, the 
landing evolving and flap extending process (see Fig. 14). 
 
Fig. 14  Safety landing of BUAA-BWB RPV. 
5. Conclusions 
To eliminate the exposed landing safety problem of 
BUAA-BWB RPV from flight test, the hazard analysis 
method STPA helps to refine the critical safety con-
straints, the landing safety system dynamics archetype 
supported by 3-DOF landing simulation is valuable to 
identify the critical hazards, and the system design 
precedence contributes to make proper safety im-
provement decision.  
Flight test verified that the proposed measure is 
critical and effective to improve the safety of landing 
of the BUAA-BWB RPV. 
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